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Governance spending fixation as a tool for reform
to improve institutions
Eimantas Blazys
Faculty of Economics, Economic Policy Department, University of Vilnius, Vilnius, Lithuania
ABSTRACT
There is a consensus in the scientific community that most often
the main obstacle to development is the absence of good institu-
tions, however, it is also widely recognised, that this idea is of little
use without explanations on how they can be improved and made
to self-sustain ‘good equilibrium’. Purpose of this article is to pro-
pose such an explanation together with a tool for reform that could
potentially address this issue. For this purpose, literature review is
conducted to explore links of institutions to economic growth in
search for opportunity to have a positive effect to the system
through means of reform. Such an opportunity is found exploring
governance-corruption-economic growth connection, to exploit
which, a simple method is proposed that involves only basic math.
A matching exercise between governance spending variables and
governance evaluation variables reveals both a best way to judge
governance spending and a potential value for orientation that
could be used for limiting misallocation of resources in countries
with governance overspending. At first glance a modest find may
have significant practical implications, as this value could be used
as a tool for reform, application of which could be expected to
have an effect in two complementary ways: pragmatic – inefficient
use of resources could be limited by diverting them to other gov-
ernment sectors; and incentives based, which when looked at
through a lens of literature on ‘New institutional Economics’ looks
especially promising, as in essence it could potentially enable appli-
cation of principle of free market in state governance for most of
poorly governed post-socialist European countries.
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1. Introduction
‘Demonstrating that growth is a function of good institutions is of little help if this is
not followed by an analysis of how such institutions emerge and become self-enforcing’
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(Avellaneda, 2010, p. 30). Though up until now such analysis ending with reform con-
cept propositions is absent, scientific literature is rich in clues to what needs to be
done and how. It is known from leading scientists in the field, that governance reform
concept propositions must be based on proper understanding of institutional incentives
for progress and prevention (see Kaufmann & World Bank, 2003). ‘… to be more
effective, efforts to reduce corruption should be intrinsically woven into policies to
develop institutional capacity and optimise the size of government spending’
(Dzhumashev, 2014, p. 12). Or to put it simply: incentives must be built into pay
schemes. This article suggests a governance reform concept and a tool for it, that is in
accordance with everything as above.
The end result of obtaining usable recommendations is made possible by taking an
alternative approach to mainstream economics – that is by avoiding all complex
methodologies. Instead, what works is found out in simplest possible ways, so
only basic math is used. After theoretically mapping out corruption-growth links, a
channel that is easiest to affect is chosen for governance reform. The channel is ‘rent-
seeking costs’ that transmit mitigating effect of development to corruption. A way to
evaluate state governance1 spending that is suited for reform is found by a manual
matching exercise of extreme simplicity. One concept of evaluating country’s govern-
ance spending is found to be superior to others by having values that are predomin-
antly different among groups of good governance and poor governance countries in
the country sample, while being predominantly uniform within the groups as men-
tioned. This discovery allows calculation of a benchmark value of state governance
spending of good governance country, that could potentially be used to identify mis-
allocation of resources in the form of governance overspending in severe cases. This
leads to a recommendation to lower and fix governance spending at the recom-
mended value in poor governance countries. This act is in principle the proposed
reform concept. It necessitates an overall optimisation of governance system by
reducing inefficient use of resources in the form of excess financing to governance
sector, and the very way that the governance spending is measured creates an incen-
tives-based mechanism for self-sustaining ‘good equilibrium’ or ‘optimal inclusiveness’
when speaking in terms of institutional economics.
This article is organised as follows. A review of relevant literature is in Section 2.
Theory is developed in Section 3. Section 4 contains description of methodology and
data. Results are presented in Section 5. Implications are explained in Section 6.
Conclusion is in Section 7.
2. Literature review
Idea that institutions are a primary determinant of economic performance is a con-
sensus among mainstream economic scientists and, according to some latest works,
they may be the most important factor when it comes to welfare, development and
economic growth (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Madland, 2015). Incentives created
by different institutions channel profit motive differently and this is the main reason
for differences in economic prosperity of nations (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012;
Avellaneda, 2010). Strand of analysis established for investigating the relationship
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existing between institutional framework and economic performance is generally
called ‘New Institutional Economics.’2 As summarised by Gagliardi (2008), there are
three main definitions of institutions: rules of the game (game meaning the economic
and political processes); players of the game including organisations along with the
rules in force; and self-enforcing equilibrium outcome of the game. In this article, the
terms meaning is dependent on context and is used as defined by anyone of the three
definitions, whichever best fits circumstances. As each society functions with a set of
economic and political rules created and enforced by state and citizens collectively,
conflict over scarce resources, income and power, translates into conflict over rules of
the game, the economic institutions, which determine economic activities and who
benefit from them, making political institutions a key determinant of the outcome of
this game (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; similar conclusion reached by Basu, 2004).
Scientists researching the issue come to conclusions like: countries should promote
good governance to accelerate their growth rates (e.g., Aisen & Veiga, 2013; Cooray,
2009; Dar & AmirKhalkhali, 2002), development (e.g., Basu, 2004; Kaufmann &
Kraay, 2003; Kaufmann & World Bank, 2003; Shah, 2005), make welfare gains (e.g.,
Angelopoulos, Philippopoulos, & Vassilatos, 2009; Kaufmann & World Bank, 2005),
attract foreign direct investment (e.g., Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Globerman & Shapiro,
2002; Peres, Ameer, & Xu, 2018; Wisniewski & Pathan, 2014), increase happiness
(though be it after dispensing with poverty first) (Changbin, 2018) and so on, or sim-
ply that governance and institutions matter in one way or another.3 Some conclusions
were formulated into useful insights like: ‘… ending endemic corruption requires
ensuring that people with a high personal aversion to corruption choose to become
government bureaucrats’ (Kahana & Qijun, 2010, p. 7) or: governance improving
requires institutional incentives for progress and prevention mechanisms (Kaufmann
& World Bank, 2003). Some works provide general principles that can be used for
governance innovation to encourage investment and growth (e.g., de Ferranti, Jacinto,
Ody, & Ramshaw, 2009; Fisman & Werker, 2011). These and many other authors did
a wonderful job at expanding our understanding in the field of governance and insti-
tutions with their works that explored the issue and formulated tasks for the next
step. An extension of their work would logically be suggesting reform concepts for
helping good institutions to emerge and become self-enforcing, which is where main
contribution of this article lies, thus putting it on the forefront of current academic
effort to give usable suggestions for governance reform and doing it in highly harmo-
nious fashion in regard to other literature that is already present (Bason, 2017;
Sørensen, 2017, etc.).
The main difficulty in this topic is that consensus among scientists goes only as far
as recognising that institutions and politics that keep them in place are important.
There are no accepted single definitions, let alone single accepted measures on these
issues. Politics is first defined as activities associated with governance.4 While there is
a consensus among scientists that governance is important, definitions of it are plen-
tiful5 and proposed ways to measure it are in the range of hundreds.6 This is so,
because international organisations use the term ‘good governance’ and discuss its
promotion in the context of their main objectives, just as scientists do the same by
adopting definitions and measures according to specific contexts, challenges or end
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goals desired. Furthermore, as pointed out by Bersch and Botero (2014): ‘Governance,
like many other concepts in the social sciences, is a latent variable. It is not directly
observed but inferred based on other observable manifestations (indicators) of the
latent quantity (governance, or a dimension of governance such as rule of law.)’
(p. 11). The same line of thought is found in work of Malik (2002) who notes
that ‘… governance is essentially a qualitative phenomenon, quantification of which
would always be subject to considerable empirical limitations’ (p. 3). ‘Governance was
never allowed to become a conceptual straight-jacket but was expected to function as
a rather loose framework within which each researcher could creatively explore polit-
ical issues of significance. The problem that we encounter, therefore, is not the limita-
tions stemming from the imposition of a confining concept, but rather the opposite:
the challenge of making sense of the wide range of interpretations of governance that
the authors bring to the agenda’ (Hyden, Olowu, Hastings, & Ogendo, 2000, p. 6).
Consequently, validity of every governance evaluation concept is debatable including
the one used in this article and this must be accepted as an inherent property of
this topic.
The most widely accepted and used governance measure today is World Governance
Indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (1999a, 1999b) in
World Bank, which comes in form of six separate indexes representing six key aspects of
disaggregated concept of governance complete with its definition.7 Authors acknowledge
that ‘every one of [their] underlying data sources—or any other potential measure for that
matter—is at best an imperfect proxy for governance’ (Kaufmann et al., 2007, p. 3). Not
surprisingly, WGI has plenty of critics pointing out various possible deficiencies and giv-
ing arguments that put its practical use in question. The ones that make author of this art-
icle to take a different approach in measuring governance are following: it has been
shown that converging and diverging developing countries do not differ in terms of these
indicators as well as some others (Khan, 2007); secondly: an opinion exists that ‘the effi-
cacy of [any governance aspect improving] institutional reforms may be conditional on
transformations of underlying economic and social structures that themselves determine
the degree to which governments can be held to the goals embodied in such reforms or
whether they are yet another in a long series of dead letters’ (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007, p. 3).
It is worth adding, that creators of WGI as well as most other authors are notorious for
avoiding to directly link governance and development indicators. Though understandable
from professional standpoint and useful for some scientific purposes, such position is not
helpful when it comes to governance reform concept development, as it possibly ignores
complex reality of interlinks8, as governance and development are sometimes linked by
definition.9 These interlinks likely make up a complex and dynamic system that is referred
to in literature as the underlying structure. Regardless of whether it is called socioeco-
nomic, sociopolitical, institutional or economical – it is one and the same all-encompassing
structure, that is a background of every economic action. Understanding interlinks is cru-
cial for reform concept development, therefore established governance indicators such as
WGI are disregarded in favor of a different evaluation concept proposed by World Bank.
Obvious simplification of finding links between desired factor and governance is to
choose a convenient definition as a starting point. For this reason, definitions given
in World Banks ‘Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series. Public Services
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Delivery’ (2005) are used together with appropriate elements of the framework for
governance quality evaluation as offered by the series. In the work mentioned is
stated that: ‘Chapter [2] introduces a measurement that allows both theoretical work
and policy issues to be discussed in the framework of a concrete definition of govern-
ance quality. The definition used could easily be modified to reflect different beliefs
about the relevance of the components used in this index. The index could also be
narrowed or broadened to reflect differences in beliefs about the role and scope of
government’ (Shah, 2005, p. 54). In other words, this framework was designed to be
adaptable to specific circumstances, which is the first thing to pay attention to, when
it comes to designing institutional reforms, and therefore it will be used in this art-
icle. Definition used for governance evaluation criteria selection is as follows:
‘governance is a multifaceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of
authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of the
resource endowment of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the
impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens.’ (Shah,
2005, p. 40). As noted by the series: ‘Although no single index can conceptually cap-
ture all aspects of governance, a focus on key observable aspects of the governance
dimensions can be helpful…’ (Shah, 2005, p. 40). To this end, present article uses
concept of governance evaluation using corruption and social development10 as
offered by the series.
In order to be useful, idea of underlying economic structures has to take shape of
a blueprint to work with. For this to happen, identification of relevant factors and
mapping of links among them has to be made. It may be proper to begin with real-
isation made by Yahyaoui, Chatti, and Chtourou (2008) that no clear distinction can
be made between governance and institutional factor, however, institutions generally
correspond to a broader concept.11 The same line of thought is found in work of
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) who state: ‘… reality is that public spending, govern-
ance and development outcomes are interlinked …’ (p. 3) and there is no shortage
of studies to back this up nor is this realisation unique to authors mentioned alone.12
Greatest threat to good governance comes from corruption, violence and poverty.13
When working with countries in which latter two factors are at levels that do not
threaten governance, they can be excluded, making corruption the main threat by
this UN definition. From the structure of WGI and work of Kaufmann and World
Bank (2003) is known that corruption is one among other closely intertwined govern-
ance components (p. 5). Another insight by Kaufmann and World Bank (2003) is
that, in some settings, a form of corruption can shape political forces and outcomes
and therefore can become a force of its own instead of being a symptom of more
fundamental political forces. This ‘grander’ form of corruption is referred to as state
capture and is described as tendency by some elite firms and conglomerates to illicitly
shape the formation of state laws, policies, and regulations. Summing up information
above, it can be concluded that corruption is the single biggest threat to good govern-
ance while being its component and is capable to become a force of its own at shap-
ing rules of the game for business environment, which all implies that it is a key
determinant of nature of institutions in countries where violence and poverty do not
present a threat to governance. As noted by Khan (2004) the same ends as in the
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case of state capture can be achieved by legal processes of lobbying, political contribu-
tions and so on, which converts illegal influence-buying in the form of corruption
into legal influence-buying of different sorts. Realisation that powerful elites and con-
glomerates may play an important role in shaping rules of the game for business
environment by legal means, as well as illegal ones, implies that what is commonly
perceived as corruption, is much more than a problem of bureaucracy. As political
institutions are rules that govern incentives in politics and determine the nature of
economic institutions, ‘state capture’, together with its legal forms, by their ability to
directly affect these rules, constitute both a key channel and a fundamental force of
entire underlying system with sole purpose of exerting a direct effect on the equilib-
rium making institutions more extractive.14 Though having much in common with
corruption as commonly perceived, this force and its effect is not necessarily negative
from social standpoint. On the contrary – it is an essential ingredient of dynamic and
vibrant capitalist system and is inseparable from process of creative destruction and
progress. By making institutions more extractive and thus pushing equilibrium
towards more inequality, it increases incentives to put more effort to economic activ-
ity as returns from it are also increased. Without it, economy is bound to degrade to
stagnant socialist system the likes of which are synonymous with economic failure
due to absence of right incentives. Too much of it results in extractive institutions
taking over and causing welfare loss by increasing inequality, poverty and with very
much the same end result of economic stagnation and social decline. Grander form
of corruption referred to as state capture is one of forms of expression of this funda-
mental force that is balancing out with another fundamental force that pushes equi-
librium to the opposite direction – demands of society for general welfare and
equality. In such setting, systemic means for keeping ‘good equilibrium’ are needed.
In order to design those means, understanding links between factors is key. For the-
oretical mapping of these links, corruption is a logical starting point due to its
importance in the growth–governance relationship.
Analysis on corruption has to begin with two different existing views on the issue.
Corruption as a major obstacle to development is the dominating view. The other
one is known as ‘greasing of wheels’ hypothesis general idea of which is that corrup-
tion can, in some cases, foster development by promoting efficiency, which is done
by allowing private sector to correct or circumvent government failures of various
sorts, and so, to facilitate economic activities, that otherwise would not be. Real-world
instances that support this view likely are happening as judged by positive relation-
ship between FDI and corruption (see Egger & Winner, 2005), yet any positive out-
come is always associated with low levels of corruption and/or specific circumstances
usually involving governance failure of some sort, that itself can be removed as part
of an anti-corruption policy (Khan, 2004). When it comes to governance, corruption
could help to overcome government failures in the short term, however, it creates
incentives to keep these failures and create more of them in the long term (Aidt,
2009). It is thought that different incentives created by different institutions are the
main reason for differences in economic prosperity of nations (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012). Due to inherent property of corruption to create ‘wrong’ incentives
in governance, ‘greasing of wheels’ hypothesis is incompatible with prosperity
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improving governance reforms and therefore is disregarded. This can be backed up
further by research suggesting that corruption reduces substantially the growth rate of
genuine wealth per capita—a direct measure of sustainable development, therefore
any positive effect on growth is likely to be unsustainable development (Aidt, 2009).
For these reasons, corruption is synonymous with governance failure, therefore, it
can be possible to improve governance and institutions by proposing reforms, that
put in place incentives to resist it or block its effect transmission channels.
Adequate understanding of corruption is necessary for institution improving
reform development, therefore analysis of its types is needed. Kaufmann and World
Bank (2003) begins this analysis with separating ‘pettier forms of corruption such as
administrative bribery and ‘grander’ form – illicit formation of state laws, policies
and regulations referred to as ‘state capture’. According to Kaufmann and World
Bank (2003), the principal difference between these two forms is that in case of first
one, the problem is within bureaucracy, which is generally and wrongly attributable
to the whole concept of corruption.15 In case of ‘state capture’, powerful elites and
conglomerates illicitly shape rules of the game, making local bureaucracy more of a
means rather than the source. Surveys show that when corruption is unbundled into
its components, though types of it are correlated with each other within a country or
a region, across some dominating type differs (see Kaufmann & World Bank, 2003),
which implies that needed reforms may also differ (see Khan, 2004). Concept of cor-
ruption encompasses a wide range of behavior. As summarised by Morris (2011):
‘among the criteria most commonly used to draw distinctions are: the institutional
location and function of the public official involved (“political corruption” versus
“bureaucratic corruption”), the direction of influence (“bribery” versus “extortion”),
and the size and frequency of the transaction (“grand corruption” versus “petty
corruption”)’ (p. 13). This list of criteria is in no way complete or the only one avail-
able (e.g., Khan, 2004), however, others will be disregarded because in this article cor-
ruption is grouped according to its effect transmission channels to economic growth
with the aim of mapping their interrelation and identifying any possible opportunity
for potential institutional reform.
Main classification of corruption of this article:
Bribery is an offer of money or favors to influence a public official. ‘Kickbacks
operate much like a bribe, but illegal payment is made after the service is rendered,
usually from a portion of the governmental award itself’ (Morris, 2011, p. 1); speed-
money, where money is given to official to shorten the time needed to pass proce-
dures by legal means or not, and extortion, where the public official threatens to use
(or abuse) state power to induce payment of a bribe, are all added to the category
of ‘bribery’.
Cronyism with its variations and other names of nepotism, clientelism, elitism by
their essence all are favoritism shown by public officials to relatives or close friends.
As described by Morris (2011): cronyism is the practice of partiality in awarding jobs
and other advantages to friends or trusted colleagues, especially in politics and
between politicians and supportive organisations, for instance, this includes appoint-
ing ‘cronies’ to positions of authority, regardless of their qualifications. Purchase of
appointed position can be viewed as the most extreme case of bribery, however, in
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present work it is grouped as cronyism, because it is hard to imagine it happening
without the necessary connections in power. Perhaps most importantly ‘state capture’
in this article is considered an advanced stage of cronyism as in essence it is the
same privileged regulation and/or legislation and the scale of it is the only meaningful
difference. Privileged regulation and legislation usually reduces competition by trade
restrictions or government-created barriers to entry, however, avoidance of regulation
is just another form of the same.
Theft sometimes called embezzlement is stealing money or other government prop-
erty and in its end effect is similar to fraud which by definition is cheating the gov-
ernment through deceit, therefore in this article is also considered as a kind of theft.
Political graft occurs when funds intended for public projects are intentionally
misdirected in order to maximise the benefits to private interests, and in present clas-
sification is somewhere between cronyism and theft, and perhaps both at the same
time. This includes disguised transfers (where public road may be built to increase
value of real estate of cronies etc. as described by Angelopoulos, Philippopoulos, and
Vassilatos (2009) and creation of unnecessary government institutions and/or posi-
tions to employ relatives, etc. This category of corruption mainly represents altering
of public spending composition for rent-seeking purposes, that has been empirically
proven to exist (see Hessami, 2014; Mauro, 1998).
Though list of examples of any one type of corruption mentioned above is far
from complete, they are enough to see that in real world, boundaries between differ-
ent types of corruption are blur, yet still make it possible to link them to ‘effect to
growth’ transmission channels described in literature.
The first known work on empirically testing corruption transmission channels to
economic growth names three such channels: investment reduction, human capital
accumulation and political instability with the latter found to be most significant
(Mo, 2001). It must be stressed, that proportions of total strength possessed by separ-
ate elements of corruption are of little matter to present article. Dynamic nature of
corruption in real world means not only that degree of importance varies in time of
any one type, but also types themselves appear and disappear, and this makes quanti-
fication of little importance. Corruption also affects economic performance through
efficiency of public spending (Dzhumashev, 2014; Spinesi, 2009). Adding to this list is
a channel of trade openness (Hessami, 2014), misallocation of talent, distorted invest-
ment priorities (Malik, 2002). This, in turn, is achieved through distortionary tax, red
tape and increased risk. Corruption has also been shown to increase income inequal-
ity and poverty through channels of regressive taxing, poor targeting of social pro-
grams, unequal access to education, reduced social spending, and higher investment
risks for the poor (Malik, 2002). Inequality can affect growth in either positive or
negative direction. As summarised by OECD (2015), greater inequality might reduce
growth through political instability, reduced human capital accumulation and lack of
domestic demand; or increase growth through providing better incentives to work
harder, invest and undertake risks, and increased aggregate savings due to rich having
lower propensity to consume. Econometric analysis suggests, that income inequality
has a sizable and statistically significant negative impact on growth, and further ana-
lysis of data reveals that one key channel through which inequality negatively affects
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economic performance is through lowering investment opportunities (particularly in
education) of the poorer segments of the population (OECD, 2015). Level of develop-
ment may, in turn, affect corruption through rent-seeking costs which rise with wage
rate (Dzhumashev, 2014) or through cost-benefit balance if rent-seeking activities get
ever more expensive due to sophistication required or harsher punishments with
higher chances to get caught, etc. Corruption-growth transmission channels as sum-
marised above are illustrated in Figure 1, which serves as an initial blueprint to work
with, so justifying its over simplistic depiction of corruption – growth relationship
that ignores much of complex reality with ambiguous interrelations like for example
a link through shadow economy (Bayar, Odabas, Sasmaz, & Ozturk, 2018, etc).
As can be seen from Figure 1, corruption has both direct effect and indirect effect
on growth through political stability and human capital accumulation channels, as
negative effect of inequality is transmitted through them as well. This may explain
their comparatively strong overall effect on growth found by OECD, 2015. The most
revealing portion of Figure 1 could be the links coming to and from type of corrup-
tion called cronyism. Not only that it can be linked to every known negative effect to
growth transmission channel, but essential constituent of it ‘privileged regulation and
legislation’ can be accessed by legal means of lobbying and political contributions,
etc. Such efforts by legal means or not can contribute to or result in ‘state capture’,
which in turn can block both known ‘mitigating’ effect channels of growth to corrup-
tion as shown in Figure 1. Blocking of mitigating effect through ‘rent-seeking costs’
channel is best revealed in summaries by Berrios (2010) where statement can be
Figure 1. Corruption-growth interrelation. Source: Authors own illustration.
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found that commonly proposed remedy to strengthen law enforcement will not work
if law enforcers are captured by the interests they are supposed to regulate (p. 247).
Capability of corruption to block attempts of better redistribution is straight forward
and self-evident due to its definition: illicit shaping of rules and regulations.
Explanation on how this works is given by Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). After empir-
ically finding that weak and even negative causal effect runs in the direction from per
capita incomes to governance, authors name the phenomenon of state capture as the
most likely reason. ‘If the fruits of income growth largely accrue to an elite that bene-
fits from misgovernance, then any possible positive impact of income growth on gov-
ernance could be offset by the effect of the elite’s negative influence’ (Kaufmann &
Kraay, 2002, p. 27). ‘To the extent that state capture is important, higher incomes
may be appropriated by the monopolistic captors or elites. This, in turn, can lead to
additional demand for private purchase of laws and regulations ensuring the contin-
ued dominance of the elite. The net effect is to erode overall governance, particularly
the public protection of property rights, the incidence of corruption, and more
broadly, rule of law.’ (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002, p. 29). So authors describe the work-
ings of a vicious circle that can be seen in Figure 1 and that cannot be broken by
paying more to bureaucrats or hiring more of them. It is a description of an extract-
ive system getting ever more extractive as is described in the work of Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012). In this context, it must be stressed that the entire issue of corrup-
tion is not straight forward. As warned by Kaufmann and World Bank (2003): ‘a fal-
lacy promoted by some in the field of anti-corruption, and at times also by the
international community, is that the best way to fight corruption is by fighting cor-
ruption— that is, by means of yet another anti-corruption campaign, the creation of
more anti-corruption commissions and ethics agencies, and the incessant drafting of
new laws, decrees, and codes of conduct’ (p. 88). The author warns that all this
together with instinctive tendency to over-regulate comes at the expense of a focus
on prevention and incentives for integrity, and has reduced the effectiveness of anti-
corruption efforts. Clearly what is needed is incentives based mechanism that would
balance out public and private interests and help prevent the system from becoming
excessively extractive regardless of whether caused by corruption or by legal means.
3. Theory
The most obvious way to have an effect on the entire system is through rent-seeking
costs (ref. Figure 1). Presumably, the larger these are – the less likely should be the
incidence of corruption. There are two different approaches to increase rent-seeking
costs: through higher salaries to bureaucrats and through cost–benefit balance includ-
ing higher chances to get caught, severity of expected punishment, level of sophistica-
tion required, etc. Both of these approaches are complementary, however, the second
one is more heavily reliant on existing institutional background to work properly,
therefore is more vulnerable to corruption. When levels of corruption are high
enough ‘de juro’ and ‘de facto’ is separated and rules set by law, in essence, lose their
purpose. The first approach of salary regulation seems to be more reliable lever to
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influence the issue and better suited for technocratic approach that is needed to
design a governance system reform.
From literature analysis in section 2, it is clear that more governance spending can
have no positive effect on its quality and harm economy by not putting it to better
use, such as investing into public capital (misallocation of resources). Underfinancing
governance can also be harmful due to unnecessary limitations of the state to play its
role in social transformations needed for development (Khan, 2004) and incentives to
engage in rent-seeking that insufficient salary provides to otherwise fair bureaucrats.
Theoretically this means that there could be an optimal level of governance spending,
maintaining which could strengthen governments capabilities in governance, as insuf-
ficient financing could be detected and remedied, and in case of excess financing –
loss of funds should incentivise finding optimal structure of government institutions
by ditching unnecessary establishments and unnecessary regulations, etc. making
overall structure more efficient. Even a governance spending value suited only for
approximate orientation could be used for keeping in check needless growth of bur-
eaucracy and misallocation of resources caused by it in countries with severe
overspending.
4. Methodology and data
To find a recommendable level of governance spending, it has to be put against
evaluation criteria, and nature of relation must be determined.
For the purpose of governance quality evaluation, appropriate elements of frame-
work given in World Banks ‘Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series.
Public Services Delivery’ (2005) are used as mentioned in section 2. From work as
described above, among other things, present article ‘borrows’ concept of governance
quality evaluation using corruption and social development. The main difference of
present work and the one described above is that instead of aggregating chosen
indexes into one as is in the case of proposed by the series ‘governance quality index’
(GQI), no aggregation is done, and chosen indexes are used as they come from pro-
viding sources. This is so, because aggregation as a method is known for its inherent
loss of information. As cited in section 2, index given in the series is intended to be
modified in any way found necessary together with definitions, and the whole pur-
pose of the series is to provide a framework in which governance could be discussed,
therefore it can be argued, that dispensing with aggregation while leaving evaluation
components as suggested does not constitute a departure from the framework.
There are three broad categories of social progress indexes that measure welfare:
‘corrected GDP’; indexes that do not use GDP; and composite indexes that include
GDP. ‘Corrected GDP’ use national accounts and GDP as the foundation and then
add or subtract quantities to mitigate unsuitability of GDP itself to be used as a wel-
fare measure. Indexes that do not use GDP do not measure economic activity; rather,
they measure environmental or social activities, well-being, or changes in environ-
mental, social, or human capital (Costanza, Hart, Posner, & Talberth, 2009). This
group includes subjective welfare measures that attempt to measure satisfaction with
quality of life. This group will be disregarded in this research. Indexes that include
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GDP are composite indexes that combine several different measures into a single
number. Human Development Index (HDI) made by United Nations Development
Program is perhaps the best-known of the group and will be used in this research
together with best-known corruption index – Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
made by Transparency International. To check robustness, research will be done
twice – using another welfare measure and another corruption index. To approxi-
mately represent category of ‘corrected GDP’ group – productivity will be used for a
second social welfare measure together with possibly second best-known corruption
index – Control of Corruption index calculated by International Country Risk Guide.
Data of governance spending is taken from Classification of Functions of
Government (COFOG) in Eurostat database (see Appendix in Data file for details).
Country sample is limited by the database: 31 countries – 28 EU membersþ Iceland,
Norway and Switzerland; however, sample had to be reduced due to insufficient data
for Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Iceland. Period of 2001 to 2016 selected also due to
data availability issues.
In order to evaluate governance spending – a comparative statistic must be derived
for cross country comparison. It is not known which way of assessing governance
spending is best suited for this purpose, therefore several of them are tested. First
option is governance spending – gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, that will be
referred to as variable A. In order to have governance spending in perspective of liv-
ing standards of local people in particular country, a second comparative statistic is
made by calculating governance spending per worker per year ratio with average
brutto monthly salary in that country. Put it bluntly: it shows what portion of
monthly income does an average worker in a particular country has to pay for the
country’s governance as if it’s one of public services (perhaps the ultimate one). This
variable will be referred to as B. It may make sense that governance spending could
rise with an increase of overall population of a country, therefore a third variable C
is introduced by calculating governance spending per person per year ratio with aver-
age brutto monthly salary in that country.
In order to find optimal or at least recommendable level of governance spending
to be used as a benchmark, it has to be determined which of the three comparative
statistics (variables A, B, or C) is best fit for the purpose. Best-governed countries
must have similar governance spending among themselves and worst-governed coun-
tries also must have similar governance spending among themselves, and it must be
different from the one of best-governed countries. In order to find such pattern, an
extremely simple manual matching test is used: in a sample of countries of any given
year, top and bottom seven values (a quarter of sample) of evaluation criteria (welfare
and corruption measure) are put against each of the comparative governance spend-
ing statistics (variables A, B, and C). This is done in order to see if governance
spending measured in any comparable way can be matched to better development
and/or corruption indexes, which both serve as governance evaluation criteria in this
research. Fitness of different governance spending evaluation statistics (variables A, B,
and C) for the purpose of determining benchmark governance spending is judged by
distribution of their top and bottom seven values in relation to top and bottom seven
values of evaluation criteria of governance. To put it simply: if top (or bottom) seven
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values of governance spending are found to be among seven least developed or seven
most corrupt countries in the sample and/or bottom (or top) seven values of govern-
ance spending are found to be among seven most developed or seven least corrupt
countries in the sample – it would be evidence of existence of optimal governance
spending value as measured by that particular governance spending evaluation vari-
able. Since governance is evaluated using two separate statistics – welfare and corrup-
tion measure, and a country may or may not have them both belonging to top or
bottom seven values of the sample at a given time period, it is considered a match if
any of seven top or bottom values of governance spending variable being tested are
among any of top and/or bottom seven values of any of the two evaluation criteria.
To put it simply: if highest seven values of governance spending are found to be
among countries with lowest seven values of welfare measure or highest seven values
of corruption or both – it may be interpreted as evidence of highly inefficient govern-
ance system due to misallocation of resources. The same goes vice-versa: if lowest
seven values of governance spending are found to be among countries with highest
seven values of welfare measure or lowest seven values of corruption or both – it
may be interpreted as evidence of superior efficiency of the system of those countries
and an indication of what governance spending must be.
In cases where multiple values of any variable of any given year are the same and it is
impossible to separate top or bottom values so that there would be seven of them in total
– all recurrent values are treated as top or bottom seven in the matching exercise, how-
ever, if there is more than one recurrent value, total number of them used for matching
exercise is kept as close to seven as possible, but not less than seven. To put it simply: if
there are nine top or bottom values that are the same of any variable of the given year,
then all nine of them are used for matching, however, all other values are ignored. In cases
where there are two top (or bottom) values of any variable with four recurrences each,
making eight top (or bottom) values in total – all eight are used for matching exercise, etc.
This is so in order to see if top or bottom values of any governance spending evaluation
(variables A, B, or C) point out best-evaluated governance.
In order to make matching exercise easier and more graphic, top seven govern-
ance evaluation criteria variables (welfare and corruption measure) are colored in
green, while bottom seven – in red. Similarly, seven highest values of governance
spending evaluation are colored in red and seven with lowest values – in green. To
both match distribution of values and compare how each of the three governance
spending evaluation variables is matching with selected governance evaluation crite-
ria, exercise is carried out manually, by making a separate table for each year with
all seven variables of all the countries in the sample. As mentioned above, this is
done twice: research 1 uses Human Development Index (HDI) and Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) as governance evaluation criteria, values of which are
checked for matching with values of governance spending evaluation (variables A, B
and C) in Tables 24a–24p (contained in data file); research 2 is done in exactly the
same fashion as research 1 only governance evaluation criteria used are different:
productivity is used instead of HDI and Control of Corruption index is used instead




Manual matching exercise reveals the best way and the worst way for measuring
governance spending in relation to governance quality. Robustness of the find is
proven by the fact that both researches give similar conclusions in the sense that
best way for measuring governance spending is found best at both researches;
second best is second best at both researches and one is found to be useless also at
both researches.
From result table, it can be seen that best conception for judging governance
spending in relation to governance quality is variable B, which is governance spend-
ing per worker per year ratio with average brutto monthly salary of the country. This
way of measuring governance spending surpasses others on nearly every statistic used
to describe accuracy of it’s matching with selected governance quality evaluation indi-
cators, and shows satisfactory overall results. In this article from this point onward
‘governance spending’ refers exclusively to measurement by variable B unless other-
wise stated. Its seven lowest governance spending values have 83.2% matching in
research 1 and 79.6% matching in research 2 with one or both top seven values of
governance quality evaluation. Seven highest values of governance spending (red)
have 82.1% matching in research 1 and 89.3% matching in research 2 with one or
both bottom seven values of governance quality evaluation.
Percentage of mismatches 2.2% and 1.8%, respectively, could have at least two pos-
sible explanations. First, one must allow for a possibility, that these figures may show
some kind of developments in governance institutions. Increased governance spend-
ing in high development and low corruption country may signal corruption of polit-
ical institutions, however, temporary misallocation of resources and possible acts of
corruption are not capable of instantaneously undermining development and, likely,
do not affect corruption perception, especially if these acts stay undiscovered, there-
fore method used in this research is unfit to prove or disprove this. Such suspicion is
suggested by the fact that most mismatches that were found are rare occurrences of
Table 1. Results of governance spending evaluation variables matching with governance quality
evaluation criteria exercise.
Research 1a Research 2b
Governance spending evaluation variable: A B C A B C
Percentage of matches green to greenc 75.0% 83.2% 81.3% 69.2% 79.6% 81.3%
Percentage of matches red to redc 61.3% 82.1% 73.0% 53.8% 89.3% 74.8%
Percentage of matches (total) 68.2% 82.7% 77.1% 61.5% 84.4% 78.0%
Percentage of mismatches (total) 17.2% 2.2% 9.3% 47.8% 1.8% 9.7%
Note: aResearch 1 uses HDI and CPI as governance evaluation criteria for matching exercise with each of governance
spending evaluation variables (A, B, and C).
bResearch 2 uses productivity and corruption control indexes as governance evaluation criteria for matching exercise
with each of governance spending evaluation variables (A, B, and C) and is carried out in exactly the same fashion
as research 1.
cGreen and red refers to top five governance evaluation criteria values (of both welfare and corruption measure)
being colored in green, while bottom five – in red. Similarly, highest five values of governance spending evaluation
are colored in red and five with lowest values – in green. This is done to all three governance spending evaluation
variables (A, B, and C) used for the matching exercise as described in the methodology section.
Source: Authors’ calculation. See Results section in Data file.
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highest values of governance spending among low corruption and high development
countries, that are exceptions to otherwise a rule of low governance spending relating
to good governance performance. An opposite occurrence – if high corruption and
low development country would decrease its governance spending to the level of at
least that of an average of good governance country sample, could suggest that an
effort is taking place to combat excess bureaucracy and misallocation of resources,
and this might be the case for Bulgaria. Unfortunately, there is another way to
explain mismatches: there might be differences in how statistics used in research were
calculated within different providing countries and at different time periods.
Possibility of biased data cannot be excluded.
A surprising find is that governance spending ratio with country’s GDP (variable
A) is the worst way to judge governance spending. It has every worst statistic from
ones used to describe accuracy of it’s matching with selected governance quality
evaluation indicators, with number of mismatches especially impressive when com-
pared to other two tested variables: 17.2% and 20.5% against 2.2% and 1.8% of vari-
able B and 9.3% and 9.7% of variable C. For this reason, judging governance
spending by its ratio with GDP must be pronounced useless and poten-
tially misleading.
The objective of finding optimal governance spending value is not achieved due to
limitations of the method used. Since match between lowest values of variable B and
top values of governance quality evaluation is not perfect, it cannot be concluded that
lowest values are optimal. This is all that this research is capable of uncovering in
regard to optimal governance spending value, not least because of probability that
none of the countries in the sample may have it.
Benchmark value of governance spending, that can be used for determining ineffi-
ciencies in severe cases, could potentially be suggested using obtained data. It has
been uncovered that while lowest governance spending values as measured by vari-
able B are commonly found among best-governed countries, highest values are mostly
found among countries with worst governance. This relationship gives reason to
believe that optimal value is somewhere at the lower end of the scale of governance
spending as measured by variable B and allows to make a claim, that an average value
of good governance countries can be used for orientation by countries with poor gov-
ernance performance. To obtain such value, several averages are calculated. First, an
average value of variable B is calculated for countries with highest development values
for every year (Average 1), then an average value of the same variable is calculated
for least corrupt countries in the sample for every given year (Average 2). Last, aver-
age value is calculated for countries that have at least one of top governance quality
evaluation figures used in research (Average 3) for every year. Table of average values
of governance spending of best governance countries in the country sample is given
in Table 27 in Data file. Statistics describing resulting collection of average values as
described above are given in Table 2.
Data in Table 2 shows that an average governance spending value of best-governed
countries in the sample is remarkably consistent regardless of which way the average
is calculated with only 5.3% coefficient of variation in the time period even if consid-
ering values of all three options (average 1,2 and 3) simultaneously. This leads to a
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conclusion that average value of governance spending per worker per year ratio
with average brutto monthly salary of best governed countries could potentially be
used as a benchmark to determine misallocation of resources in comparatively poor
governance countries that have larger governance spending than suggested value.
Namely those countries are: Romania, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia, Czechia,
Lithuania, Greece and Italy. In the well-governed countries in the sample that
includes Norway, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, United
Kingdom, Luxembourg, Finland, Belgium, and Sweden the latter four could poten-
tially also find the value useful.
6. Implications. Changing the rules of the game
Up until this point in history, governments themselves determined governance spend-
ing with no guidance of any kind. To some countries it has worked well.
Government members and people working as bureaucrats and possessing fundamen-
tal willingness to do the right thing for their nations have played their crucial part in
building and maintaining countries of yet unseen prosperity in human history.
Problem is that not all countries have enough of people with ‘right mindset’ that can
resist rent-seeking temptations and successfully maintain ‘good equilibrium’ by pre-
venting their economic institutions becoming excessively extractive. This failure
requires systemic changes to make things right. The idea is to use governance spend-
ing fixation as a tool for governance reform, which mainly consists of one act: lower-
ing and fixing governance spending by legal acts, using governance spending per
worker per year ratio with average brutto monthly salary of the country. Proposed
reform would exert its effect on governance institutions via two channels: checking of
resource misallocation and incentivising institutional progress.
After its implementation, all government sector workers beginning with top gov-
ernment members and ending in lowest rank bureaucrats are in a position where
they all share a common salary pool that is fixed by proportion and not in total size.
This implies that a government sector worker has three options how to increase per-
sonal income in the form of salary: (1) through increasing efficiency of governance
sector and/or (2) through increasing numbers of non-governance workers and/or (3)
through increasing salaries of local population.
The first option of salary increase gives incentives to increase efficiency of govern-
ance sector. This can be achieved by joining institutions, getting rid of redundant
procedures, functions, positions, closing down unnecessary establishments, reducing
number of government workers etc. Useless compliance work is likely to become the
first victim of the proposed system once it is in place.
The second option of salary increase implies that there is a strong incentive to
solve unemployment problem, as every additional worker automatically means bigger
Table 2. Statistics describing collection of averages of variable B for every year of both researches
of best governance countries.
Min value Max value Median Average Coef. of variation SD
0.86 1.09 0.99 0.99 5.26% 0.052
Source: Authors’ calculation. See Results section in Data file.
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overall governance sector salary pool. The reform provides strong incentives to solve
social problems, as this means more and better workers and more economic growth,
all of which translates to bigger governance spending/salary pool.
The third option of salary increase is to increase salaries of local population.
Raising salaries in government sector would also increase governance sector salary
pool. Though proposed reform cannot directly increase salaries in private sector, it
can affect them indirectly, by providing incentives to government sector to find best
possible use to public resources so to best aid economy and people, which is the job
of government anyway. It is known that government corruption alters public spend-
ing composition for rent-seeking purposes (see Hessami, 2014; Mauro, 1998). Making
salaries directly dependent on carrying out governance functions in best possible
manner not only gives incentives to do so, but more importantly, it creates an envir-
onment in government sector that is intolerant to rent-seeking activities, beginning
with those that visibly waste resources and therefore do not make or prevent proper
contribution of public funds to economy, like already mentioned alteration of public
spending for rent-seeking purposes, disguised transfers, fraud, expropriation of public
property, cronyism and theft of public funds, etc. It is unlikely that incentives to fos-
ter economic development and make best use of public resources and at the same
time discouraging certain forms of corruption can fail to positively contribute to the
overall economy, however, true reach of proposed reform concept goes beyond this.
The most important contribution to state governance of proposed reform concept
is that by rewarding willingness to do the ‘right thing’ and encouraging intolerance to
corruption and incompetence it creates environment in which good institutions and
true professionals with knowledge, capability, desire to work for their people and full
dedication to their profession can emerge and thrive. This is due to large salaries that
are likely to appear with time when governance system is sufficiently optimised.
7. Conclusion
By now there is plenty of literature suggesting that institutions play a central role in
development and it is thought that they work by creating different incentives.
Literature study on the topic reveals that from the start of the twenty-first century
scientific community largely converged at a consensus that can best be described as a
call to take ‘the next step’ (Kaufmann & World Bank, 2003) that is to make use of
large body of literature that is now present and to suggest reform concepts intended
for application. At present, explanations on how institutions can be improved are
rare and usually very general, therefore of limited use. In this context, present article
takes full account of widely accepted wisdom that institutional factors come down to
governance issues which ultimately sum up into ‘good/bad equilibrium’, and suggests
that further progress can be made through study of interrelations of governance com-
ponents with economic growth. The suggestion is complete with an example of how
reform concepts can be developed using only basic math and theoretical framework
that is available. Specifically, this article suggests how governance spending fixation
could be used as a tool to improve institutions in nearly all comparatively poorly gov-
erned countries of the sample excluding Bulgaria. Namely those are: Romania,
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Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia, Czechia, Lithuania, Greece and Italy. In the well
governed countries in the sample that includes Norway, Switzerland, Germany,
Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Finland, Belgium,
and Sweden the latter four countries could potentially also find the suggestion useful.
This is made possible by using elements of framework given in World Banks ‘Public
Sector Governance and Accountability Series. Public Services Delivery’ (2005). From
it, present article takes concept of governance quality evaluation using corruption and
social development and some definitions that are then used together with insights
found in other literature on the subject, to expose and map links of governance to
other factors (see Figure 1). Mapping these links allows to identify ‘rent-seeking costs’
channel as the simplest way to make a positive effect to growth in corruption–growth
relationship. Theory of existence of optimal level of governance spending is proposed.
Radically simple manual matching exercise is used to reveal that best suited for
obtaining a recommended value is governance spending per worker per year ratio
with average brutto monthly salary of that country (variable B). The same method
shows that while lowest governance spending values as measured by variable B are
commonly found among best-governed countries, highest values are mostly found
among countries with worst governance. This relationship gives reason to believe that
average value of variable B of best-governed countries could potentially be used as a
benchmark value for poorly governed countries to keep in check both misallocation
of resources and excessive growth of bureaucracy. Optimal governance spending value
was not found due to limitations of the method used and therefore remains an
objective for future research. Finding it would enable application of the proposed
reform concept to every country instead of only the worst-governed ones that bench-
mark value suggested by this article could potentially enable. Making governance sec-
tor salaries dependent on salaries of local population could ensure that institutions
cannot become excessively extractive, thus be helpful in keeping ‘good equilibrium’.
By setting rules so that government workers at all levels contribute to public good
simply by acting in their own personal best interest to increase their own personal
gain, proposed tool for reform could potentially enable greeting governance sector
with invisible hand of Adam Smith, therefore creation of a dataset dedicated for
tracking governance spending should be considered by Eurostat.
Notes
1. Governance spending is not a synonym to government spending. Rather it is a
constituent of it. See Appendix in Data file for description.
2. See Gagliardi (2008) for literature analysis and references regarding the term ‘New
Institutional Economics’.
3. See Gradstein (2008), Makuta and O’Hare (2015), Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2004), Pushak, Tiongson, & Varoudakis (2007), Huynh and Jacho-Chavez
(2008), Vijayaraghavan and Ward (2001), Efendic, Pugh, and Adnett (2011), Nelson and
Sampat (2001), Jetter (2014), Klomp and Haan (2009) among many others.
4. In all three main dictionaries (Merriam-Webster, Oxford and Cambridge) term ‘politics’
first is defined as activities associated with governance.
5. Gisselquist (2012) summarises working definitions of good governance from selected
multilaterals in Table 1, p. 8. Author notes that ‘not only do definitions vary across
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organizations, they also vary within organizations’. Gisselquist (2012, p. 3) and provides
five different governance definitions used by World Bank.
6. Malik (2002) gives a rough estimate of over 150 quantitative indicators on governance
(p. 3). The World Bank Institute data portal on Actionable Governance Indicators is said
to have 1182 of them (Wetzel, 2009, p. 10).
7. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (1999b, p. 1) ‘… define governance broadly as the
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1)
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity
of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them.’ Definition then is used to organise a subset of governance
indicators into six clusters: key aspects of the process by which those in authority are
selected and replaced are summarised with clusters ‘Voice and Accountability’ and
‘Political Instability and Violence’; capacity of the state to implement sound policies is
captured by two clusters ‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Regulatory Burden’; respect of
citizens and the state for the rules which govern their interactions is captured by ‘Rule of
Law’ and ‘Graft’.
8. There is no doubt that governance and development are linked, however, the direction of
causality is debated at present point in time. Gisselquist (2012) presents six of the simplest
causal possibilities illustrated by figure: ‘… first, good governance may ‘promote’ or ‘cause’
development (path A). Second, development may cause good governance (B). Third,
another factor may cause both (C). Thinking in the disaggregated terms sketched above, it
is also possible that some component of good governance may cause development (D);
development may cause some component of good governance (E); or a third factor may
cause both (F). To complicate the story still further, it could also be that some
component(s) of good governance causes development (or some component(s) of
development), while others contribute to economic stagnation, but that the effect of those
that cause development is stronger. Alternatively, it could be that the interaction of several
components of good governance causes development. Or, these ‘paths’ could operate
sequentially, such that ‘B’ leads to ‘A’ or ‘C’ leads to ‘E’, and so on’ (p. 19).
9. Gisselquist (2012) highlights that six countries by their definitions tie governance
specifically to development objectives (p. 9). The same link is made in some UN
documents (Gisselquist, 2012, p. 8). The most explicit link by definition is made by
World Bank (Gisselquist, 2012, p. 6).
10. In this article, terms ‘social development’, ‘welfare’ and ‘social progress’ are used
interchangeably.
11. Yahyaoui, Chatti, and Chtourou (2008) state: ‘the question of the governance takes us
then to that of the institutions and the study of the first one must necessarily pass by the
study of the question of the ability of institutions to support the growth. Indeed, no clear
distinction can be made between the concept of governance and institutional factor.
Institutions generally correspond to a broader concept which includes the formal and
informal constraints, rules and laws which are associated not only with the state’s
functioning but also with that of the private entities’ (p. 2).
12. To list of authors in Kaufmann and World Bank (2003; p. 16) it can be added:
Kaufmann and Kraay (2008); Afonso and Furceri (2010); Karim, Zouhaier, and Adel
(2013) and many others.
13. Definition found in Gisselquist (2012, p. 6) Table 1 is said to originally come from
United Nations website.
14. As defined by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), to be inclusive, economic institutions
must feature secure private property rights, an unbiased system of law, a provision of
public services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and
contract; it also must allow people to choose their careers and permit the entry of new
businesses, thus presenting economic opportunities not just for the elite, but for a broad
cross-section of society so reducing the importance of monopolies and creating a
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dynamic and inclusive market economy and paving the way for two other engines of
prosperity: technology and education, all of which reduces the economic benefits that can
be secured in the short run by usurping political power. Economic institutions are
referred to as extractive when they have opposite properties to those of inclusive and are
called so because they are designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of
society to benefit a different subset.
15. The notion that corruption is not solely a problem of bureaucracy is not limited to
Kaufmann and World Bank (2003). de Ferranti, Jacinto, Ody, and Ramshaw (2009, p. 27)
devote two chapters of their book to explaining oversimplifications of principal-agent
model and give detailed description of multiple mismatches with reality of view that
citizen-principals are public- spirited and like-minded. The same view is found in work
of Kahana and Qijun (2010).
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